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BACK 
T71ese ren1al.l:~ Miere delivered c~s the Iteynote 
addi-css for- the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Selvice's Thir-d Biennial blidwest 
,41-bit1-atior1 Symposiu7n at Minneapolis, 
Apiil 12, 1996. Most reference citations have 
beaz deleted. For a copil of this article 1vit11 
ftill citations please contact the LQN editor. 
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A strong new ideological 
current is sweeping through 
much of the Western World. At  
one extreme it manifests itself 
as a deep distrust of big 
government. In more modest 
form, it is a sense of skepticism 
or disillusionment about the 
capacity of big government to 
deal effectively with the 
problems confronting our 
society. In continental Europe 
today there is much talk of the 
principle of "subsidiarity," the 
notion that social and economic 
ills should be treated at the 
lowest level feasible, usually the 
level closest to the people 
directly affected. In the United 
States there is much talk of 
"privatization," the transfer or 
subcontracting of many 
traditional governmental 
functions to private industry. 
These ideas have their 
counterpart in our own field of 
labor and employment law. In 
some respects there is nothing 
new about all this. In the earlier 
part of this century labor 
unions, bruised as they were by 
many encounters with a strike- 
stopping, injunction-wielding 
judiciary, looked upon law and 
government as more foe than 
friend. Unions responded 
warmly to the laissez-faire 
philosophy embodied in the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act  of the 
early 1930s. Management as 
well as labor came to regard 
government involvement as 
intrusive; both espoused the 
private settlement of union- 
employer disputes through 
collective bargaining and 
voluntary arbitration. Even 
when the federal government 
began to intervene more 
actively, through the Wagner 
and Taft-Hartley acts, Congress 
directed the newly reorganized 
Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service to "make its 
... services available in the 
settlement of ... grievance 
disputes only as a last resort 
' and in exceptional cases." 
Indeed, so ardent a champion of 
collective bargaining and 
grievance arbitration as Dean 
Harry Shulman decried the very 
concept of court litigation over 
labor agreements. 
In the mid-1960s and continuing 
thereafter, the preeminence of collective 
bargaining in the governance of the 
American workplace began to erode. Certain 
ancient problems, like race and gender 
discrimination, workplace safeiy, and 
pension and benefit guarantees, proved 
intractable. At the same time union density 
and bargaining power were declining. 
Government had to step in. And it did so 
through the whole series of laws ~ ~ ' l t l ~  which
we have become so familiar - the Equal 
Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Ci\il 
hghts Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age 
Discrimination in Emplojment Act (ADEPI), 
the Occupational Salety and Health Act 
(OSHA), the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), and all the rest. To 
add to the onslaught of governmental 
regulation, some $5 states during the 1980s 
seized upon one legal theory or anodler to 
ameliorate the worst rigors of the traditional 
American doctiine of employment at ndl.  
Then came the cou~lterre\~olution. The 
tkmpayers rebelled, Newt Gingrich rode into 
Washington, and i11e underfunded Iederal 
and state judiciaries and administrati~ie 
agencies began to buckle under the 
avalanche of employee complaints. 
The Equal En~ploymeni: Opportunity 
Colnmission alone xias receiving about 
100,000 charges of cliscrimination a year 
and its backlog soared past thai figure. 
Employers, dismayed by seven-figli-e jury 
verclicts in wrongful discl~arge actior-is and 
the $100,000 costs of even a successful 
E T A  
defense, began increasingly to seek private accorded "great \~,eigllt" if suppor~ed by an 
means of settling disputes with their adequate record. 
ivorlters. And Congress, in both the A much more receptive attitude toward 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 arbitration hvas eshibited by tlle Suprerne 
and the Civil fights Act of 1991, espressly Court in Giliner v. Interstatefiolz~zsoi L m ~ e  
encouraged alternative methods of C o ~ y .  (1991). A 7-2 majority mled that an 
resolving discrimination disputes "where indilidual emploJ7ee of a brokerage firm 
appropriate and to the extent authorized who was subject to a Stock Exchange rule 
by law." That is where we are today. Once requiring arbitration of all employment 
more the tide is turning, this time away disputes could not sue directly on an age 
from formal governmental procedures and discriminadon claim under ADEA, but 
back toward such private, relatively could be ordered to arbitraie instead. 
informal processes as mediation and The majority emphasized that the Federal 
Arbitration Act favors arbitration. 
Alexmzder was distinguished on the 
grounds the arbitrator there was only 
The courts and arbitration authorized to apply the contract, while 
the Stock Exchange rules empowered 
Initially, the courts had been rather arbitrators to resolve statutoly claims as 
unreceptive to arbitrators' handling of  ell. Technically, the holding in Gilnzer 
employment discrimination cases. Thus, in could be ~reated as just an exhaustion-of- 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) the remedies requirement, a requirement that 
Supreme Court held that an arbitral award one go to arbitration before seeking a 
finding '$st cause" for a termination under judicial remedy, but the language of the 
a collective bargaining agreement did not oplnion is much broader in lts endorsement 
prevent the discharged employee from of arbitration and the finality of arbitration. 
seeking a de izovo trial in federal court of his The Court stressed that the broker was not 
claim of racial discrimination in violation losing a statutory right; he was merely 
of Title VII. The stated rationale was that being required to use a different forum for 
the arbitrator only applied the contract, not the enforcement of that light. As a practical 
the statule, and that Title VII supplements matter, the Court was also affected by the 
and does not supplant other i-igl~ts, leaving fact that the employee in Gilmer executed 
the employee free to pursue both claims. the arbitration agreement himself, 
The Court seemed untroubled by Spielberg while Alexander involved "collective 
Mfg. Co. (1955), under which the National representation" and the possible conflicts 
Labor Relations Board will "recognize" or that might present. 
"honor" an arbitral award in a11 unfair labor In my opinion, Alexa~zder should be 
practice case, as long as certain safeguards modified and Giln~er extended to autl~orize 
are met, even though there too the the final and binding arbitration of 
arbitrator is technically only dealing with statutory claims when that is provided lor 
contract rights and the Board is dealing in either a collective bargaining agreement 
with the employee's statutory right under or an individual en~ployee-employer 
the National Labor Relations Act to be free contract. There would of course be need, 
of antiunion discrimination or coercion. especially in the individual case, for close 
Even under Alexander, however, the Court scrutiny to prevent any possible coercion, 
acknowledged in the now-famous footnote surprise, or other overreaching by a more 
21 that the arbitral award could be powerful employer. There would also have 
admitted in the court suit and could be to be procedural safeguards, as I shall 
discuss shortly, to ensure the fairness and 
integrity of tlze process. 
My views on the desirabilty of an 
increasing resort to private arbitration for 
the resolution of statutory disputes, 
including civil rights issues, find support in 
the words of such distinguished federal 
appellate judges as Alvin Rubin of the Fifth 
Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit, 
and Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit. 
Judge Rubin suggested that "some 
problems can best be resolved by gving a 
wider hand to collective bargaining and to 
resolution of disputes in arbitration." Even 
more pointedly, Judge Fletcher declared 
that "arbitration . . . is the best forum for 
the grievant. . . . [A] rbitrators have it within 
their power and their grasp to improve the 
process in order to accomplish the goals of 
Title MI." 
Perhaps most noteworthy of all are the 
observations of Judge Harry Edwards, 
because he was an active practitioner in 
labor law and an eminent labor scholar at 
both Michigan and Harvard before 
ascending the bench, and because he 
formerly expressed "grave reservations 
about arbitrators deciding public law 
issues." On the basis of his experience on 
the court, Judge Edwards changed his 
mind. Said he: "I believe that arbitration 
should be explored as a mechanism for the 
resolution of individual claims of 
discrimination in unorganized, as well as 
unionized, sectors of the employment 
market." Like Judges Rubin and Fletcher, 
Judge Edwards stressed the speed and cost 
savings of arbitration as advantages over 
litigation in the resolving of disputes. The 
greater informality of arbitration can also 
be conducive to a lessening of employer- 
employee hostility, which is especially 
desirable in the event reinstatement is 
ultimately ordered. 
Guaranteeing due process 
If private procedures like arbitration, 
agreed to by the employer and the 
employee, are to supersede the 
administrative or judicial procedures 
prescribed by a statute, there should be 
guarantees that customary "due process" 
standards are applicable. Two prestigious 
groups have recently set forth their 
precriptions for the required procedural 
safeguards. Those were the Dunlop 
Commission on the Future of Worker- 
Management Relations and a task force 
convened by the American Bar Association, 
consisting of representatives of the ABA 
Labor and Employment Law Section, the 
American Arbitration Association, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, the National Employment 
Lawyers Association, and the Society of 
Professionals in Dispute Resolution. 
The Dunlop Commission strongly 
recommended the development of private 
arbitration procedures for handhg 
workplace disputes, including statutory 
issues. To ensure that the public law rights 
of individual employees would not be 
jeopardized, the Commission proposed 
several "quality standards": 
1. a neutral arbitrator who knows the 
law, jointly selected by the parties; 
2. fair and simple procedures, including 
discovery; 
3. cost-sharing to help ensure arbitral 
impartial it)^; 
4. independent representation if the 
employee wants it; 
5. remedies equal to those provided by 
statutue; 
6. a written arbitral opinion @ling the 
rationale; and 
7. judicial review to ensure colnpliance 
with goveining law, but limited with 
respect to the arbitrator's findings of fact. 
The ABA-convened task force, 
composed of persons from highly diverse 
organizations, did not reach consensus on 
a number of issues, although in some 
respects its recommendations were even 
more detailed than the Dunlop 
Commission's, with special emphasis on 
the need for the training of arbitrators 
about statutory law. In any event, the 
major standards for due process contained 
in the task force's "protocol" closely 
paralleled the Commission's: 
1. an impartial arbitrator with 
knowledge of the statutory issues at stake, 
jointly selected by the parties; 
2. adequate but limited pre-hearing 
discovery; 
3. cost-sharing to help ensure arbitral 
impartiality; 
4. the right to representation by a 
person of the employee's own choosing; 
5. whatever relief would be available 
under the law; 
6. an opinion and an award, including a 
statement of the issues resolved and the 
statutory claims disposed of; and 
7. a final and binding award subject to 
limited renew. 
Arbitration: A condition 
of employment? 
There is one important issue on whch 
the Dunlop Commission takes a stand, and 
which the Task Force sidesteps. May an 
employer make an employee's agreeing to 
arbitration a condition of employment? 
The Commission flatly says "No," at least 
not "at this time." The Commission 
declares that "any choice between available 
methods for enforcing statutory 
employment rights should be left to the 
individual who feels wronged rather than 
dictated by his or her employment 
contract." Although it does not say this in 
so many words, the Commission would 
apparently allov,~ an employee to contract 
for binding arbitration only after a dispute 
has arisen. At least in a discharge case, the 
employee would then have little or nothing 
The result of this sophisticated 
scheme is a sensible tradeoff. 
Employees are guaranteed 
certain irreducible substantive 
rights. In return employers are 
relieved of the risk of crushing 
legal liability. Both sid 
are provided proced 
that should be simp 
faster, and cheaper 
than the current jury 
system. 
to lose if he or she offends the employer by 
refusing to agree to arbitration. I detect a 
hint of ambivalence within the 
Commission on this issue, however; it goes 
on to remark that if private arbitration 
systems prove themselves in enforcing 
public rights, then the nation could decide 
"whether employers should be allowed to 
require their employees to use them as a 
condition of employment." 
The Task Force reflected its hybrid 
composition in announcing that it "takes 
no position on the timing of agreements to 
arbitrate statutory employment disputes, 
though it agrees that such agreements be 
knowingly made" (emphasis supplied). The 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, in a policy statement of July 
1995 concerning alternative dispute 
programs to be developed under 
Commission auspices, insisted that "parties 
must knowingly, willingly and volunta~ily 
enter into an ADR proceeding" (emphasis 
supplied). Moreover, the Commission 
would permit an employee to opt out of a 
proceeding at any time before its resolution 
and to go ahead and file a lawsuit instead. 
I don't think th s  issue is as easy as it 
may seem to some. We can start with the 
comfortable premise that no employee 
should have to gve up a statutory right to 
a particular forum as the price for a job. 
But there is respectable employer 
testimony that businesses will often be 
unwilling to agree to arbitration after a 
dispute has arisen. At that point in a 
particular case they may have more to gain 
by just sitting back and awaiting the 
lawsuit that in many instances will never 
materialize. 
Thus, as a practical matter, the real 
choice may be between allowing the 
employee to agree to arbitration in 
advance, as Mr. Gilmer did, or greatly 
diminishing the likelihood that arbitration 
will ever be used. What does the employee 
actually lose if required to arbitrate? 
Statutory forums and jury trial rights 
sound all very fine in theory, but what 
good are they if the EEOC is so burdened 
by a case backlog that it must resort to 
triage, as it now does with its "A," "B," and 
"C" classifications of cases, tossing out 
many charges wholesale after the briefest of 
investigations? And what good are the 
statutory rights if the courts are so far 
behind schedule that the employee must 
wait three or four years for an enforceable 
judgment? It  seems to me at least arguable 
that many employees would be much 
better off with arbitration, even as a 
condition of employment, as long as there 
was guaranteed the type of procedural 
safeguards called for by the Dunlop 
Commission and the ABA-convened task 
force. At any rate, I think this is a question 
that deserves to be fully debated, with less 
emphasis on abstract theory and more on 
pragmatic considerations of the sort I have 
described. So far, incidentally, a court of 
appeals has simply held that an employee 
must "knowingly" agree to arbitrate a 
Title VII claim before forgoing statutory 
procedures. At most a "knowing" 
agreement is all I can see in the Supreme 
Court's Gilmer case. 
Deferring to arbitration 
The birthpains we are witnessing as the 
courts and the agencies seek a viable 
system of arbitrating statutory civil rights 
claims had earlier parallels in the judicial 
and administrative treatment of other 
statutory disputes. As I mentioned 
previously, the National Labor Relations 
Board, in its SpielbergIOlin line of cases 
(1955 and 1984), held that it would 
"honor" or "defer to" an arbitral award in a 
subsequent unfair labor practice case if 
certain standards had been met. The 
arbitration proceedings had to be fair and 
regular; all parties had to agree to be 
bound; the decision must not have been 
"clearly repugnant" to the policies of the 
act; the contract issue before the arbitrator 
had to be "factually parallel" to the unfair 
labor practice issue before the board; and 
the arbitrator had to be "presented 
generally" with the facts relevant to 
resolving the ULP issue. In Alexander v. 
Gardlzer-Denver, the Supreme Court 
explicitly declined to apply the Spielberg 
doctrine to Title VII cases, but it did not 
question the validity of Spielberg in the 
NLRA context. 
Later, and more controversially, the 
NLRB extended the deferral doctrine to 
situations where the ULP charge had been 
filed before there was any arbitral award. 
111 Collyer Insulated Wire (1971), the board 
held that it would defer to the arbitration 
procedure in those cimmstances also, 
provided the employer's action being 
challenged did not undermine the union, 
[he employer's action was based on a 
"substantial claim" under the contract, and 
the arbitral interpretation of the contract 
would likely resolve the ULP issue as well. 
Collyer itself involved a charge against an 
employer for allegedly refusing to bargain 
by taking certain unilateral action in 
violation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Subsequently, and still more 
controversially, the board extended the 
Collyer doctrine to individual cases of 
alleged discrimination. While Collyer dealt 
with contract issues that might seem 
peculiarly appropriate for arbitral 
resolution, United Teclz~zologes dealt with 
an individual's statutory rights against 
antiunion discrimination, which some 
might deem as sensitive as the civil rights 
at stalte in Alexander and Gilmer. Yet the 
courts have generally gone along. 
Finally, I should mention Barrentine v. 
Arlznnsns-Best Freiglzt Sys. (1981). There the 
Supreme Court held, in a 7-2 decision, that 
employees were not barred from suing on 
wage claims under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act by an adverse arbitration 
award under the collective bargaining 
agreement. The majority reasoned that 
statutory rights under the FLSA, like Title 
VII rights, are individual rights, no[ 
collective lights, and are not ~vaivable by a 
union. Putting Alexa~zder, Bm-re~ztiize, and 
Giblzer together, it does appear that the 
Supreme Court may give individual 
elnployees greater power to waive statutoqr 
rights and commit to binding arbitration 
than is accorded their union representatives 
under collective bargaining agreements. 
That makes sense if one is skeptical about a 
union's capabilities and zeal in 
safeguarding the rights of the employees it 
represents; it makes far less sense if one 
focuses on the relative bargaining power of 
employers, unions, and individual workers. 
In addition to the whole range of statutory 
rights which now seems to be opening up 
as a new arbitral domain, there is another 
large area looming on the horizon which 
may become a fertile source of arbitration 
practice. It is a further example of the 
widespread trend in society, of which I 
spoke at the outset, to seek solutions for its 
problems outside the formalized processes 
of government. Begnning in the 1960s, 
and accelerating rapidly during the 1980s, 
there was a movement in the state courts of 
some 45 jurisdictions to modify the once 
universal principle of employment at will. 
As bluntly expressed by one nineteenth 
centuly American court, that meant 
employers could "dismiss their employees 
at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or 
even for cause morally wrong." Workers 
could be fired for refusing to engage in 
illegal price fixing or even for refusing to 
commit perjury at the behest of the 
employer. 
Benefitting both employers 
and employees 
At-will emplojmlent remains a 
substantial problem today. Professor Jack 
Stieber of Michigan State University 
calculates that there are roughly 60 million 
at-will emploj~ees in the United States, of 
whom about two million are fired annually. 
Of these, Stieber believes 150,000 or more 
ivould have valid causes of action if they 
had the same "just cause" rights afforded 
nearly all the union workers under 
collective bargaining agreements. 
The stale courts lzave used three 
principal theories to modify e~nployrnent at 
will. Each has serious deficiencies lor 
employees and employers alike. The first is 
the public policy exception. But that takes 
an egregious violation, such as dischargng 
an employee for refusing to commit a 
crime. Relatively few employees will find 
that modification useful. 
Second is the contract exception. 
An employer may be held liable for an 
arbitrary disnxissal if it has included a 
guarantee of no discipline except for good 
cause in an employee handbook. But an 
employer can avoid  hat restriction by 
simply refraining from any such 
assurances, or even by excising any 
existing prolections from personnel 
manuals wit11 adequate advance notice. 
The third and potentially most 
expansive theory, the notion that every 
contract contains an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing that forbids an 
u~xjust discharge, has doctrinal infirmities 
and has been accepted by only a handful 
of states. 
Finally, the employees who win in court 
are rarely rank-and-file workers. Only 
professional and managerial employees are 
likely to lxave large enough claims to attract 
the attention of l aye r s  operating on the 
basis of contingent fees. 
On the other hand, when an employer 
beconxes enmeshed in a common-law 
~il-ongful discharge action, the results can 
be a healy financial blow. Several studies 
of California cases showed that a plaintiff 
employee who can get to a jury will win 
about 75 percent of the time, with the 
average award around $450,000. 
Multimillion dollar verdicts for single 
individuals are not uncommon across 
the country. 
Even the successful defense of a jury 
case may cost $100,000 to $200,000. And 
two years ago a RAND study estimated that 
the "hidden costs" of the common-law 
regme - for example, keeping on 
inefficient employees out of a fear of 
expensive lawsuits - amount to 100 times 
as much as the court judgments and other 
legal expenses. 
Alternative dispute resolution 
procedures are needed for the benefit of 
e\.eryone, employers as -tvell as employees. 
In August 1991 the prestigous National 
Conference of Comn~issioners on Uniform 
State Lanls adopted. by the resounding 
rote of 39 state delegations to 11, the 
Model Employment Termination Act 
(META). META prohibits the dismissal of 
most full-time employees after one year of 
senice unless there is "good cause." The 
preferred method of enforcing META is 
through the use of professional arbitrators. 
The remedies are similar to those under the 
NLRA. the original Title VtI,  and the usual 
labor contract, namely, reinstatement 
with or without back pay. General 
compensatoty and punitive damages are 
expressly excluded. 
The result of this sophisticated scheme 
is a sensible tradeoff. Employees are 
guaranteed certain irreducible substantive 
rights. In return employers are relieved of 
the risk of crushing legal liability. Both 
sides are provided procedures that should 
be simpler, faster, and cheaper than the 
current jury system. 
META has been introduced in over a 
dozen state legslatures. Despite its 
ovenvhelming endorsement by the 
Uniform Law Commissioners, however, its 
prospects for early enactment anywhere are 
bleak in the current political climate. 
In the longer term, I have high hopes. The 
United States is the last major industrial 
democracy in the cvorld without legal 
protections for workers' jobs, and I cannot 
believe we shall remain such an outcast 
indefinitely. When we do see the light - 
some time in the nest millenium - it will 
mean, directly or indirectly, a dramatic 
expansion in arbitration practice. The most 
thorough study to date found that in the 
mid-80s arbitrators were handling 
approslmately 65,000 union grievances in 
a year. With less than 15 percent of the 
American work force currently organized, 
one could anticipate at least a four- or five- 
fold increase in employee coverage if laws 
like META became universal. Even if we 
assume that only a third or so of the 
existing arbitration caseload consists of the 
kind of discharge or disciplinay issues that 
would be subject to legslative protections, 
the result could still be some 100,000 new 
arbitration cases annually. 
In the meantime, many employers 
across the country. deeply disturbed by the 
large jury verdicts returned in wrongful 
discharge actions, have instituted their own 
private programs for the arbitration of 
disputes with their employees. In some 
respects this development is highly 
salutary; at least it may re~o~gnize some 
modification in at-will employment and 
the existence of some worker rights in their 
jobs. But in other respects it can be a cause 
for concern. Employers, for example, may 
exercise excessive control over the choice 
of the arbitrator. Subconsciously, arbitrators 
may be influenced, or they may be 
perceived to be influenced, by the fact the 
employer is a "repeat player" in unilaterally 
established plans and the one often paylng 
the bill. Some arbitrators may be deterred 
from participating in these plans because of 
fear they may be used as union-avoidance 
devices. For all these reasons employer- 
promulgated arbitration systems call for 
special scrutiny and the erection of due- 
process safeguards to ensure the fair 
treatment of employees. Yet on balance, 
with appropriate shields in place, I 
consider them better than nothing. Some 
employees who are unfairly fired will get 
their jobs back, and I think that is worth 
the extra trouble on the part of arbitrators 
operating under these novel arrangements. 
In 1986 arbitrators handled about 2000 
non-union grievances during the year - 
about 3 percent of the total. 
then than I am now, I had the temerity to 
take issue with David on the ending of the 
golden age. Today I have a better sense of 
what David was driving at. There wnc a 
purity, an appealing simplicity about 
arbitration in the two or three decades 
following World War 11, when unions and 
employers were pretty much unchallenged 
lords of their own process. Ours is a much 
more untidy world, where arbitrators must 
often look over their shoulders to see 
whether their work is squaring with the 
dictates of "the law." Yet I still do not feel 
quite the same sense of loss as Professor 
Feller. There are golden ages and there are 
golden ages. Simplicity has its attractions; 
so does complexty. In David Feller's 
cherised era, private parties ruled both the 
substance and the procedure of 
employment regulation. Then government 
took over a large swath of the two areas. 
Today private parties are regaining a 
significant share of the procedure, but 
substantive legal regulation remains intact. 
Arbitrating in this complex new milieu 
should be seen as an exciting challenge 
rather than as a dispiriting letdown. As I 
said twenty years ago, if it is true in any 
sense that we have lost a golden age of 
arbitration, it may just be akin to leaving 
behind the simple nobility of ancient 
Greece, and moving on to the sophisticated 
glories of the High Renaissance. 
Court-sponsored arbitration 
A final phenomenon of recent times, 
and a final example of the "privatization" 
that has been an underlying theme of this 
paper, is the referral of employer-employee 
disputes to an arbitrator by a court. I do 
not know how widespread this practice is, 
or how much jawboning by a judge it takes 
to get the parties to go along. But it 
represents one more way in which the 
venerable instrument of union-management 
arbitration is undergoing transformation to 
meet a new set of needs in society. 
Two decades ago that peerless labor 
lawyer and scholar, David Feller, spoke 
poignantly of the passing of what he called 
the "golden age of arbitration." By that he 
meant a time when the parties' system was 
essentially autonomous, concerned 
primarily with contract self-enforcement, 
and unsullied by a preoccupation with 
external law. Being somewhat younger 
TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, James E. and 
Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, is known 
his writing in thefield of labor relations and 
has engaged in arbitration. He began his 
academic career at the University of Michigan 
Law School in 1965 and sewed as its Dean 
horn 1971 to 1 978. He has also taught as a 
visitor at Cambridge, Dtthe and Gcorge 
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